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Social learning is defined as the ability of a population to aggregate information, a process which
must crucially depend on the mechanisms of social interaction. Consumers choosing which product
to buy, or voters deciding which option to take respect to an important issues, typically confront
external signals to the information gathered from their contacts. Received economic models typi-
cally predict that correct social learning occurs in large populations unless some individuals display
unbounded influence. We challenge this conclusion by showing that an intuitive threshold process of
individual adjustment does not always lead to such social learning. We find, specifically, that three
generic regimes exist. And only in one of them, where the threshold is within a suitable intermediate
range, the population learns the correct information. In the other two, where the threshold is either
too high or too low, the system either freezes or enters into persistent flux, respectively. These
regimes are generally observed in different social networks (both complex or regular), but limited
interaction is found to promote correct learning by enlarging the parameter region where it occurs.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Social learning has been a topic of central concern in
economics during the last decades [1], as it is central to
a wide range of socio-economic phenomena. Consumers
who want to choose among a given set of available prod-
ucts may seek the opinion of people they trust, in addi-
tion to the information they gather from prices and/or
advertisement. And voters who have to decide what can-
didate to support in an election, or citizens who have to
take a stand on some issue of social relevance may rely on
their contacts to form their opinion. Ultimately, whether
our societies take the right course of action on any given
issue (e.g. on climate change) will hinge upon our ability
to aggregate individual information that is largely dis-
perse. Thus, in particular, it must depend on the infor-
mation diffusion mechanism by which agents learn from
each other, and therefore on the underlying social net-
work in which they are embedded. The significance of the
conceptual challenges raised by these issues is made even
more compelling by the booming advance in Information
and Communication Technologies, with its impact on the
patterns of influence and communication, and on the way
and speed in which we communicate.
These key issues have attracted the interest of re-
searchers in several fields. For example, the celebrated
“voter model” [2, 3] is a prototype of those simple mech-
anistic models that are very parsimonious in the descrip-
tion of individual behavior but allow for a full charac-
terization of the collective behavior induced. The voter
model embodies a situation where each agent switches to
the opinion/state held by one of the randomly selected
neighbors at some given rate, and raises the question of
whether the population is able to reach consensus, i.e. a
situation where all agents display the same state. The
literature on consensus formation, as reviewed e.g. in
Refs. [4, 5], has focused, in particular, on the role played
by the structure of the underlying network in shaping the
asymptotic behavior. One of the main insights obtained
is that the higher is the effective dimensionality of the
network the harder it is for conformity to obtain [6, 7].
Consensus formation in social systems is closely related
to the phenomenon of social learning. Indeed, the latter
can be regarded as a particular case of the former, when
consensus is reached on some “true” (or objective) state
of the world, for example, given by an external signal
[8, 9] impinging on the social dynamics.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, economists have
stressed the micro-motives that underlie individual be-
havior and the assumption of rationality. They have also
emphasized the importance of going beyond models of
global interaction and/or bilateral random matching, ac-
counting for some local structure (modeled as a social
network) in the pattern of influence or communication
among agents. This literature (see Ref. [10] for an early
survey) has considered a number of quite different sce-
narios, ranging from those where agents just gather and
refine information [11, 12, 14] to contexts where, in addi-
tion, there is genuine strategic interaction among agents
[13]. Despite the wide range of specific models consid-
ered, the literature largely conveys a striking conclusion:
full social conformity is attained (although not necessar-
ily correct learning), irrespectively of the network archi-
tecture. On the other hand, to attain correct learning,
one must require not only that the population be large
but, in the limit, that no individual retain too much in-
fluence [13, 15].
The model studied in this paper displays some simi-
larities to, as well as crucial differences with, those out-
lined above. To fix ideas, the model could be regarded
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2as reflecting a situation where, despite the fact that new
information keeps arriving throughout, the consequences
of any decision can only be observed in the future. Even
more concretely, this could apply, for example, to the
performance of a political candidate, the health conse-
quences of consuming a particular good, or the severity
of the problem of climate change, on all of which a flow of
fresh information may be generated that is largely inde-
pendent of agents’ evolving position on the issue. So, as
in Ref. [9], the agents receive an external signal; however,
the signal is noisy and it is confronted with the behavior
displayed by neighbors. As in Refs. [12, 13], while the
agents make and adjust their choices, they keep receiv-
ing noisy signals on what is the best action. In contrast,
however, these signals are not associated to experimen-
tation. In this respect, we share with Ref. [14, 15] the
assumption that agents’ arrival of information is not tai-
lored to current choices.
The problem, of course, would become trivially un-
interesting if agents either have unbounded memory or
store information that is a sufficient statistic for the
whole past (e.g. updated beliefs in a Bayesian setup).
For, in this case, agents could eventually learn the best
action by relying on their own information alone. This
leads us to making the stylized assumption that the par-
ticular action currently adopted by each individual is the
only “trace” she (and others) keep of her past experi-
ence. Thus her ensuing behavior can only be affected
by the signal she receives and the range of behavior she
observes (i.e., her own as well as her neighbors’). Under
these conditions, it is natural to posit that if an agent
receives a signal that suggests changing her current ac-
tion, she will look for evidence supporting this change
in the behavior she observes on the part of her neigh-
bors. And then, only if a high enough fraction of these
are adopting the alternative action, she will undertake
the change. This, indeed, is the specific formulation of
individual learning studied in the present paper, which
is in the spirit of the many threshold models studied in
the literature, such as [16–19].
In the setup outlined, it is intuitive that the “accep-
tance threshold” that agents require to abandon the sta-
tus quo should play a key role in the overall dynamics.
And, indeed, we find that its effect is very sharp. First,
note the obvious fact that if the threshold is either very
high or very low, social learning (or even behavioral con-
vergence) cannot possibly occur. For, in the first case
(a very high threshold), the initial social configuration
must remain frozen, while in the second case (a very low
threshold), the social process would enter into a state of
persistent flux where agents keep changing their actions.
In both of these polar situations, therefore, the fraction
of agents choosing the good action would center around
the probability p with which the signal favors that action.
Outside of these two polar situations, we find that
there is always an intermediate region where social learn-
ing does occur. And, within this region, learning emerges
abruptly. Specifically, there are upper and lower bounds
(dependent on p) such that, if the threshold lies within
these bounds, all agents learn to play the good action
while no learning at all occurs if the threshold is outside
that range. Thus the three aforementioned regions are
separated by sharp boundaries. A similar abruptness in
learning arises as one considers changes in p. In this case,
there is a lower bound on p (which depends on the thresh-
old) such that, again, we have a binary situation (i.e., no
learning or a complete one) if the informativeness of the
signal is respectively below or above that bound. In a
sense, these stark conclusions highlight the importance of
the social dimension in the learning process. They show
that, when matters/parameters are “right,” the process
of social learning builds upon itself to produce the sharp
changes just outlined.
As it turns out, this same qualitative behavior is en-
countered in a wide variety of different network contexts.
To understand the essential features at work, we start
our analysis by studying the simple case of a complete
graph, where every agent is linked to any other agent.
This context allows one to get a clear theoretical grasp
of the phenomenon. In particular, it allows us to char-
acterize analytically the three different regimes of social
learning indicated: correct learning, frozen behavior, or
persistent flux. We then show that this characteriza-
tion also provides a good qualitative description of the
situation when the interaction among agents is medi-
ated via a sparse complex network. We consider, in par-
ticular, three paradigmatic classes of networks: regular
two-dimensional lattices, Poisson random networks, and
Baraba´si-Albert scale free networks. For all these cases,
we conduct numerical simulations and find a pattern
analogous to the one observed for the complete graph.
The interesting additional observation is that local in-
teraction enlarges (in contrast to global interaction) the
region where social learning occurs. In fact, this posi-
tive effect is mitigated as the average degree of the net-
work grows, suggesting a positive role for relatively lim-
ited/local connectivity in furthering social learning.
II. THE MODEL
There is large population of agents, N = {1, 2, ..., N},
placed on a given undirected network Γ = (N , L), where
we write ij ∈ L if there is link between nodes i and j
in Γ. Let time step s = 0, 1, 2, ... be indexed discretely.
Each agent i ∈ N displays, at any time step s, one of two
alternative actions ai(s) = ±1, which are not equivalent.
One of them, say action 1, induces a higher (expected)
payoff, but the agents do not know this.
At each time step s, one randomly chosen agent i ∈ N
receives a signal on the relative payoff of the two actions.
This signal, which is independent across time and agents,
is only partially informative. Specifically, it provides the
correct information (i.e., “action 1 is best”) with proba-
bility p > 1/2, while it delivers the opposite information
with the complementary probability 1− p.
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τ
FIG. 1: Phase diagram of the threshold model on a fully
connected network. The colors represent the fraction of agents
choosing action 1 (from red, x = 1 to blue, x = 0.5). System
size given by N = 104 agents; averaged over 100 realizations.
If agent i’s previous action ai(s − 1) does not coin-
cide with the action αi(s) suggested as best, she consid-
ers whether changing to the latter. We assume that she
chooses αi(s) (thus making ai(s) = αi(s)) if, and only if,
the fraction of neighbors in Ni ≡ {j ∈ N : ij ∈ L} who
chose αi(s) at s− 1 exceeds a certain threshold. Let this
(common) threshold be denoted by τ ∈ [0, 1].
At the start of the dynamic process, each agent receives
one signal αi(0) and adopts the corresponding action. In
other words, the initial condition for the process is one
where each agent, independently, holds action +1 with
probability p or action −1 with probability 1− p.
The central question posed in the paper can now be
precisely formulated:
What is the relationship between p (the qual-
ity of the signal) and τ (the threshold for ac-
tion change) that underlies the spread and
consolidation of action 1?
This is the question addressed in what follows, in a range
of different setups and relying on a variety of methodolo-
gies.
III. GLOBAL INTERACTION FOR INFINITE
POPULATIONS
Let us consider the case where interaction is global:
for each pair of agents i, j we have that i ∈ Nj and j ∈
Ni. Let x(t) ∈ [0, 1] stand for the fraction of agents
choosing action 1 at time t = s/N . In the limit of infinite
population size (N →∞), the dynamics is given by:
x˙ = −(1− p)x θ(1− x− τ) + p(1− x) θ(x− τ) (1)
where θ(z) = 1 if z ≥ 0 while θ(z) = 0 if z < 0. This
equation is derived by considering the change dt in the
fraction x occurring in a time interval of ndt time steps.
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FIG. 2: Typical realizations of the time evolution of the frac-
tion of agents choosing action 1, x, in a fully connected net-
work of system size N = 104with p = 0.60, and (A) τ = 0.20;
(B) τ = 0.50; (C ) τ = 0.80.
For N → ∞, for any finite dt, this increment converges,
by the law of large numbers, to a constant given by the
right hand side of Eq. (1) times dt. The first term ac-
counts for the number of agents initially with the right
signal (x) who receive the wrong signal (with probability
1− p) and adopt it, as the fraction of agents also adopt-
ing it is larger than the threshold (1 − x > τ). The sec-
ond accounts for the opposite subprocess, whereby agents
who receive the correct signal (with probability p) switch
to the correct action when the population supports it
(x > τ).
We assume that, at time t = 0, each agent receives a
signal αi(0) and adopts the corresponding action ai(0) =
αi(0). Hence the initial condition for the dynamics above
is x(0) = p.
It is useful to divide the analysis into two cases:
Case I: τ > 1/2
In this case, it is straightforward to check that
x < 1− τ =⇒ x˙ = −(1− p)x < 0
1− τ < x < τ =⇒ x˙ = 0
x > τ =⇒ x˙ = p(1− x) > 0
So, it follows that correct social learning occurs iff p > τ .
Case II: τ < 1/2
In this case, we find:
x < τ =⇒ x˙ = −(1− p)x < 0
τ < x < 1− τ =⇒ x˙ = p− x
x > 1− τ =⇒ x˙ = p(1− x) > 0
And, therefore, correct social learning occurs iff p > 1−τ .
Combining both cases, we can simply state that, in
the global interaction case, correct social learning, x∞ =
x(t→∞) = 1 occurs if, and only if,
τ ∈ (1− p, p) , (2)
that is, the threshold τ is within an intermediate region
whose size grows with the probability p, which captures
the informativeness of the signal. However, there are
other two phases: if τ ∈ (0, 1−p), the system reaches the
stationary solution x∞ = p; while if τ ∈ (p, 1), we have
x˙ = 0 for all times, which means that the system stays
in the initial condition x∞ = x(t = 0) = p.
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FIG. 3: The average survival time τsv in fully connected net-
works for different system sizes N for p = 0.60 and τ = 0.20.
The continuous line corresponds to an exponential fit of the
form τsv ∼ exp(cN), being c a constant.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Now we explore whether the insights obtained from the
infinite size limit of the global interaction case carry over
to setups with a finite but large population, where agents
are genuinely connected through a social network.
First, we consider the benchmark case of global inter-
action (i.e., a completely connected network). Then, we
turn to the case of local interaction and focus on three
paradigmatic network setups: lattice networks, Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi (Poisson) networks, and Baraba´si-Albert (scale-
free) networks.
A. Global interaction
The results obtained on the completely connected net-
work (i.e., the network where every pair of nodes is
linked) are in line with the theory presented in the previ-
ous section. The essential conclusions can be summarized
through the phase diagram in the (p, τ)-space of parame-
ters depicted in Figure 1. There we represent the fraction
of agents choosing action 1 in the steady state for each
parameter configuration, with the red color standing for a
homogeneous situation with x = 1 (i.e., all agents choos-
ing action 1) while the blue color codes for a situation
where x = 0.5 and therefore the two actions are equally
present in the population. Intermediate situations ap-
pear as a continuous color grading between these two
polar configurations.
We find that, depending on the quality of the external
signal p and the threshold τ , the system reaches config-
urations where either complete learning occurs (x = 1)
or not (x = p). Indeed, the observed asymptotic behav-
ior is exactly as predicted by the analysis of the previous
section and it displays the following three phases:
• Phase I: τ < 1−p. The system reaches a stationary
aggregate configuration where the nodes are contin-
uously changing their state but the average frac-
tion of those choosing action 1 gravitates around
the frequency x = p, with some fluctuations (see
Figure 2A). The magnitude of these fluctuations
decreases with system size N .
• Phase II: 1 − p < τ < p. The system reaches the
absorbing state x = 1 where everyone adopts action
1. This is a situation where the whole population
eventually learns that the correct choice is action 1
(see Figure 2B).
• Phase III: τ > p. The system freezes in the initial
state, so the fraction x = p of agents choosing the
correct action coincides with the fraction of those
that received the corresponding signal at the start
of the process (see Figure 2C).
It is worth noting that, while in Phase I the theory
predicts x = p, any finite-size system must eventually
reach an absorbing homogenous state due to fluctuations.
Thus, to understand the nature of the dynamics, we de-
termine the average time τsv that the system requires to
reach such an absorbing state. As shown in Figure 3, τsv
grows exponentially with N . This means that τsv grows
very fast with system size, and thus the coexistence pre-
dicted by the theory in Phase I can be regarded as a good
account of the situation even when N is just moderately
large.
B. Lattice networks
Now assume that all nodes are placed on a reg-
ular boundariless lattice of dimension 2, endowed
with the distance function d(·) given by d(i, j) =
max {|xi − xj | , |yi − yj |}. The social network is then
constructed by establishing a link between every pair of
agents lying at a lattice distance no higher than some pre-
specified level d¯. This defines the neighborhood Ni of any
agent i ∈ N , as given by Ni = {j ∈ N : d(j, i) ≤ d¯}. In
this network, the degree (i.e. the number of neighbors)
of any node ki = k is related to d¯; for instance, if d¯ = 1
we have k = 8.
The behavior of the system is qualitatively similar to
the case of a fully connected network. Again we find
three phases. In two of them, both actions coexist with
respective frequencies p and 1 − p (one phase is frozen
and the other continuously fluctuating), while in another
one the whole population converges to action 1. A global
picture of the situation for the entire range of parame-
ter values is shown in Figure 4, with the black diagonal
lines in it defining the boundaries of the full-convergence
region under global interaction. In comparison with the
situation depicted in Figure 1, we observe that the region
in the (p, τ)-space where behavioral convergence obtains
in the lattice network is broader than in the completely
5FIG. 4: Phase diagram of the threshold model on a two-
dimensional lattice with k = 8 (d¯ = 1). The colors represent
the fraction of agents choosing action 1action (from red, x =
1, to blue, x = 0.5). System size N = 104; average over 100
realizations.
connected network. This indicates that restricted (or lo-
cal) interaction facilitate social learning, in the sense of
enlarging the range of conditions under which the behav-
ior of the population converges to action 1.
As a useful complement to the previous discussion, Fig-
ure 5 illustrates the evolution of the spatial configuration
for a typical simulation of the model in a lattice network,
with different values of τ and p = 0.6. Panels a, b and
c show the configurations of the system for a low value
of τ = 1/8 at three different time steps: t = 0, 1000 and
2000 respectively. The evolution of the system displays
a configuration analogous to the initial condition, both
actions coexisting and evenly spreading throughout the
network. This is a situation that leads to dynamics of the
sort encountered in Phase I above. In contrast, Panels
g, h and i correspond to a context with a high τ = 7/8,
which induces the same performance as in Phase III. It
is worth emphasizing that although Panels a, b and c
display a similar spatial pattern, they reflect very differ-
ent dynamics, i.e., continuous turnover in the first case,
while static (frozen initial conditions) in the second case.
Finally, Panels d, e and f illustrate the dynamics for an
intermediate value of τ = 1/2, which leads to a behavior
of the kind displayed in Phase II. Specifically, these pan-
els show that, as the system moves across the three time
steps: t = 0, 16 and 21, the system evolves, very quickly,
toward a state where all agents converge to action 1.
C. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and scale-free networks
A lattice network is the simplest possible context where
local interaction can be studied. It is, in particular, a reg-
ular network where every agent faces exactly symmetric
conditions. It is therefore interesting to explore whether
any deviation from this rigid framework can affect our
former conclusions. This we do here by focusing on two
of the canonical models studied in the network litera-
ture: the early model of Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (ER) [20] and
the more recent scale-free model introduced by Baraba´si
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FIG. 5: Time evolution of the threshold model on a two-
dimensional lattice with k = 8 for different values of τ and
p = 0.60. Panels (A-C): τ = 1
8
and time steps (A) t = 0, (B)
1000 and (C) 2000. Panels (D-F): τ = 1
2
and time steps (D)
t = 0, (E) 16 and (F) t3 = 21. Panels (G-I): τ =
7
8
and time
steps (G) t = 0, (H) 1000 and (I) 2000. Black color represents
an agent using action −1, while white color represents action
1. The system size is N = 104.
and Albert (BA) [21]. Both of them abandon the regu-
larity displayed by the lattice network and contemplate
a non-degenerate distribution of node degrees.
The ER random graph is characterized by a parameter
µ, which is the connection probability of agents. It is as-
sumed, specifically, that each possible link is established
in a stochastically independent manner with probability
µ. Consequently, for any given node, its degree distribu-
tion P ≡ {P (k)} determining the probability that its de-
gree is k is Binomial, i.e., P (k) =
(
N−1
k
)
µk(1−µ)N−1−k,
with an expected degree given by 〈k〉 = µ(N − 1). In the
simulations reported below, we have focused on networks
with 〈k〉 = 8 and N = 104.
On the other hand, to build a BA network, we follow
the procedure described in Ref. [21]. At each time step, a
new node is added to the network and establishes m links
to existing nodes. The newcomer selects its neighbors
randomly, with the probability of attaching to each of
the existing nodes being proportional to their degree k.
It is well known that this procedure generates networks
whose degree distribution follows a power law of the form
P (k) ' 2m2k−γ , with γ ≈ 3. For our simulations, we
have constructed BA networks using this procedure and
a value of m = 4, leading to an average degree 〈k〉 =
2m = 8.
The networks are constructed, therefore, so that they
have the same average degree in both the ER and BA con-
texts. It is important to emphasize, however, that the de-
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FIG. 6: Phase diagram of the threshold model in a (A) ER
network and in a (B) scale-free network with average degree
〈k〉 = 8. The colors represent the fraction of agents choosing
action 1 (from red, x = 1, to blue x = 0.5). System size
N = 104, average over 100 realizations.
gree distributions obtained in each case are markedly dif-
ferent. While in the former case, the degree distribution
induces an exponentially decaying probability for high-
degree nodes, in the latter case it leads to “fat tails”, i.e.
associates significant probability to high-degree nodes.
The results are illustrated in Figure 6. For the two
alternative network topologies, the system displays qual-
itatively the same behavior found in the lattice network.
That is, there are three distinct phases yielding distinct
kinds of dynamic performance: convergence to action 1,
frozen behavior, and persistent turnover. However, it is
interesting to note that, compared with the case of global
interaction, the convergence region (which we labeled as
Phase II before) is significantly larger. This suggests that
local (i.e. limited) connectivity facilitates social learning.
Why does limited connectivity extend the learning re-
gion? Intuitively, the reason is that it enhances the posi-
tive role in learning played by random fluctuations. Such
fluctuations are neglected, by construction, in the mean-
field approximation and are also minimized when the
whole population interacts globally. But, when interac-
tion is local, those fluctuations will tend to de-stabilize
the situation in both the constant flux and in the frozen
phases – at first, locally, but then also globally.
To gain a more refined understanding of this issue, let
us try to assess the effect of local interaction on the like-
lihood that, at some random initial conditions, any given
node faces a set of neighbors who favors a change of ac-
tions. This, of course, is just equal to the probability that
the fraction of neighbors who display opposite behavior
is higher than τ , the required threshold for change. Thus,
more generally, we want to focus on the conditional dis-
tribution densities φ+(ν) and φ−(ν) that specify, for an
agent displaying actions 1 and −1 respectively, the prob-
ability density of finding a fraction ν of neighbors who
adopt actions −1 and 1, respectively. Of course, these
distributions must depend on the degree distribution of
the network and, in particular, on its average degree.
Specifically, when the average degree of the network is
large relative to population size (thus we approximate a
situation of global interaction) those distributions must
be highly concentrated around p and 1 − p respectively.
Instead, under lower connectivity (and genuine local in-
teraction), the distributions φ+(ν) and φ−(ν) will tend
to be quite disperse.
Next, let us understand what are the implications of
each situation. In the first case, when the connectivity is
high, the situation is essentially captured by a mean-field
approximation, and thus the induced dynamics must be
well described by the global interaction case (in partic-
ular, as it concerns the size of the convergence region).
In contrast, when the connectivity is low and the distri-
butions φ+(ν) and φ−(ν) are disperse, a significant devi-
ation from the mean-field theory is introduced. In fact,
the nature of this deviation is different depending on the
level of the threshold τ . If it is low, and thus action
turnover high, it mitigates such turnover by increasing
the probability that the fraction of neighbors with op-
posite behavior lie below τ . Instead, if τ is high and
action change is difficult, it renders it easier by increas-
ing the probability that the fraction of neighbors with
opposite behavior lies above τ . Thus, in both cases it
works against the forces that hamper social learning and
thus improves the chances that it occurs.
More precisely, the above considerations are illustrated
in Figure 7 for a lattice network. There we plot the dis-
tributions φ+(ν) for different levels of connectivity k and
parameter values p = 0.60 and τ = 0.30 – recall that
these values correspond to Phase I (with high turnover)
in a fully connected network. Consider first the situation
that arises for values of k = 8, 24, 56 – i.e. low con-
nectivity relative to the size of the system. Then we find
that, among the nodes that are adopting action 1, φ+
attributes a significant probability mass to those agents
whose fraction of neighbors ν choosing action −1 is below
the threshold required to change (as marked by the ver-
tical dashed line). Such nodes, therefore, will not change
their action. And, as explained, this has the beneficial
effect of limiting the extent of action turnover as com-
pared with the global interaction setup. On the other
hand, the inset of Figure 7 shows that, among the nodes
that are adopting action −1, the distribution φ− asso-
ciates a large probability mass to those agents whose
fraction of neighbors ν choosing the opposite action is
above τ . This ensures that there is a large enough flow
70 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
ν
0
5
10
15
20
φ
+
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
ν
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
φ
+
φ
−
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
ν
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
φ +
,
 
φ - 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
ν
0
1
2
3
4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
ν
0
10
20
30
A
B DC
FIG. 7: A The initial probability density φ+ that a node
using action 1 has a fraction of neighbor nodes with action
−1, computed on a two-dimensional lattice for k = 8, 24, 56,
828 and a completely connected network (from the broadest
to the narrowest probability density distribution). [Inset : φ+
(black, continuous) and φ− (red, dotted) for k = 8.] Time
evolution of the probability densities φ+ (black) and φ− (red)
in a two-dimensional lattice with k = 56 for (B) t = 0, (C)
5 and (D) 10. For all panels, the dashed line indicates the
threshold τ = 0.3; parameter values: system size is N = 104,
p = 0.60, and τ = 0.30.
from action −1 to action 1. In conjunction, these two
considerations lead to a situation that allows, first, for
some limited nucleation around action 1 to take place,
followed by the ensuing spread of this action across the
whole system (Figure 7(B-D)).
Let us now reconsider the former line of reasoning when
k is large – in particular, take the case k = 828 depicted
in Figure 7. Then, the corresponding distribution φ+ is
highly concentrated around ν = p, essentially all its prob-
ability mass associated to values that lie above τ = 0.30.
This means that the induced dynamics must be similar
to that resulting from the complete-network setups, and
thus too-fast turnover in action choice prevents the at-
tainment of social learning. Clearly, social learning would
also fail to occur for such high value of k if the threshold
τ were large. In this case, however, the problem would
be that the highly concentrated distributions φ+ and φ−
would have most of their probability mass lying below
the threshold. This, in turn, would lead to the freez-
ing of the initial conditions, which again is the behavior
encountered for a complete network.
V. SUMMARY
The paper has studied a simple model of social learning
with the following features. Recurrently, agents receive
an external (informative) signal on the relative merits of
two actions. And, in that event, they switch to the action
supported by the signal if, and only if, they find support
for it among their peers - specifically, iff the fraction of
these choosing that action lies above a certain threshold.
Given the quality of the signal, correct social learning
occurs iff the threshold is within some intermediate re-
gion, i.e. neither too high nor too low. For, if it is too
high, the situation freezes at the configuration shaped at
the beginning of the process; and if it is too low, the so-
cial dynamics enters into a process of continuous action
turnover. A key conclusion is that social learning is a
dichotomic phenomenon, i.e. it either occurs completely
or not at all, depending on whether the threshold lies
within or outside the aforementioned region.
These same qualitative conclusions are obtained, an-
alytically, in the case of global interaction – which cor-
responds to a mean-field version of the model – as well
as, numerically, in a wide range of social networks: com-
plete graphs, regular lattices, Poisson random networks,
and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks. However, the
size of the parameter region where social learning occurs
depends on the pattern of social interaction. In gen-
eral, an interesting finding is that learning is enhanced
(i.e. the size of the region enlarged) the less widespread
is such interaction. This happens because genuinely lo-
cal interaction favors a process of spatial nucleation and
consolidation around the correct action, which can then
spread to the whole population.
In sum, a central point that transpires from our work
is that, in contrast to what most of the received socio-
economic literature suggests, social learning is hardly
a forgone conclusion. This, of course, is in line with
the common wisdom that, paraphrasing a usual phrase,
crowds are not always wise. In our threshold framework,
this insight is robust to the topology or density of social
interaction. Furthermore, our results highlight the im-
portance of identifying the information diffusion mecha-
nism, and the local sampling of the population provided
by the social network. But future research should ex-
plore whether it is also robust to a number of important
extensions. Just to mention a few, these should include
(a) interagent heterogeneity – e.g. in their individual
thresholds for change; (b) different behavioral rules – e.g.
payoff-based imitation; or (c) the possibility that agents
adjust their links, so that learning co-evolves with the
social network.
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